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Get succinct state spaces fast and synthesise failure rates
Matthias Volk, Sebastian Junges, Joost-Pieter Katoen
Software Modeling and Verification, RWTH Aachen University, Germany
Abstract. This paper presents a new state space generation approach
for dynamic fault trees (DFTs) together with a technique to synthe-
sise failures rates in DFTs. Our state space generation technique ag-
gressively exploits the DFT structure — detecting symmetries, spurious
non-determinism, and don’t cares. Benchmarks show a gain of more than
two orders of magnitude in terms of state space generation and analy-
sis time. Our approach supports DFTs with symbolic failure rates and
is complemented by parameter synthesis. This enables determining the
maximal tolerable failure rate of a system component while ensuring that
the mean time of failure stays below a threshold.
1 Introduction
Fault tree analysis is a prominent technique in reliability engineering. Dynamic
fault trees (DFTs) [1,2] are an expressive model catering for common depend-
ability patterns, such as spare management, functional dependencies, and se-
quencing. The state space generation process is one of the main bottlenecks in
DFT analysis. DFT analysis mainly focuses on the mean time to failure — what
is the expected time of the failure? — and reliability — how likely is the system
operational up to time t? These analyses require DFTs where all component fail-
ure rates are known. In practice, this rarely holds. A practically relevant question
thus is to synthesise the component failure rates ensuring a given mean time.
This paper presents three main advances to state-of-the-art DFT analysis:
(1) fast generation of succinct state spaces, (2) the analysis of several measures-
of-interest that go beyond mean time and reliability, and (3) the synthesis of
(possibly partially) unknown failure rates in DFTs for mean time and more.
Fast generation of succinct state spaces. Our approach is a modern version of
one of the first DFT semantics [3] as used in the Galileo tool [4] that caters for
possible non-determinism, as in [5]. To obtain succinct state spaces, we tailor
two successful techniques from the field of model checking — symmetry reduc-
tion [6] and partial-order reduction [7, Ch. 8] — to DFTs, and combine this with
don’t care detection. We aggressively exploit the DFT structure: detect symme-
tries, i.e., isomorphic sub-DFTs and stochastic independencies while pruning
sub-DFTs that become obsolete (don’t care) after the occurrence of some faults.
This is combined with detecting superfluous non-determinism such that certain
failure orderings are irrelevant yielding a simpler and cheaper analysis.
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Fig. 1. Node types in ((a)-(d)) static and (all) dynamic fault trees.
Beyond reliability and availability. By exploiting powerful state-of-the-art quan-
titative model checking techniques [7, Ch. 10] we support a broad range of
measures-of-interest. This includes reliability and mean time to failure (MTTF),
the probability to reach a certain DFT configuration e.g., where certain subDFTs
have failed and others have not, conditional MTTF — what is the MTTF given
that certain DFT elements failed? — and the variance of the time to failure.
Failure rate synthesis. We support DFTs whose failure rates are (possibly par-
tially) unknown. These unknown (or: symbolic) rates are represented by parame-
ters, or functions thereof; e.g., components may fail with rate λ, 2λ, etc., where λ
is unknown. Our slim state space generation techniques support symbolic rates.
We complement this by a sound and complete technique to synthesise all values
of symbolic rates that ensure the MTTF (and various other measures) to be
below a given threshold. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first failure
rate synthesis technique for DFTs. In addition, the sensitivity of the MTTF on
the symbolic rates can be determined, as in alternative techniques [8].
Experimentation. We have realised a prototypical implementation of the afore-
mentioned techniques. In addition to the original DFT elements in Galileo,
we support probabilistic dependencies [9], nested spares [5] and priority or-
gates [10]. Experiments have been conducted on all benchmark DFTs from [11];
a rich collection of DFTs gathered from the literature and from industrial case
studies. The experiments reveal that our slim state space generation technique
significantly outperforms the best competitor for DFTs, the tool DFTCalc [12].
For a majority of the benchmarks, our approach yields a speed-up of two to
four orders of magnitude. Failure rate synthesis works for the moderately-sized
models in the literature (up to 20 basic events) with up to three unknown rates.
2 Dynamic fault trees
Fault trees (FTs) are directed acyclic graphs with typed nodes. The leaves, i.e.,
nodes without successors (or: children), are basic events (BEs). All other nodes
are gates. The top event (or: root) is a specifically identified node. An FT fails,
if its top event fails. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that BEs represent
component failures. Initially, every BE is operational ; it fails if the event occurs.
A gate fails if its failure condition over its children is fulfilled. The key gate for
static fault trees (SFTs) is the voting gate (denoted VOTk) with threshold k.
The failure condition for a node x of type VOTk is given by ”x fails, if k of its
children have failed”. A VOT1 gate equals an OR-gate, while a VOTk with k
children equals an AND-gate. These gates are shown in Fig. 1(b)-(d).
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2.1 Dynamic nodes
To overcome the limitations [13] of SFTs, several extensions commonly referred
to as Dynamic Fault Trees (DFTs) have been introduced. A main feature of
these extensions is that they feature an internal state, e.g., the order in which
events fail influences the internal state, and thus whether the top event has
failed. The extensions introduce several new node types; we categorise them as
priority gates, dependencies, restrictions, and spare gates.
Priority gates. Priority gates extend static gates by imposing a condition on
the ordering of failing children. A priority-and (PAND) node fails if all its children
have failed in the order from left to right. Fig. 2(a) depicts a PAND with children
A and B. It fails if A fails first and then (or simultaneously) B fails. If B fails
first, the PAND becomes fail-safe. The priority-or (POR) node [10] only fails
if the left-most child fails before any of the other children does. Priority-gates
allow for order dependent failure propagation.
Dependencies. Dependencies do not propagate a fault to their parents but are
triggered by their first child. Upon triggering, they affect some BEs, the de-
pendent events. We consider probabilistic dependencies (PDEPs) [9]. Once the
trigger of a PDEP fails, its dependent events fail with probability p. Fig. 2(b)
shows a PDEP where the failure of trigger A causes a failure of BE B with prob-
ability 0.8 (provided it has not failed before). Functional dependencies (FDEPs)
are PDEPs with probability one.
Restrictions. Restrictions do not propagate failures but rather limit possible
failure propagations. Sequence enforcers (SEQs) assure that their children only
fail from left to right. (This differs from priority-gates that do not prevent certain
orderings, but propagate if an ordering is met.) The DFT in Fig. 2(c) fails if A
and B have failed (in any order) but the SEQ enforces that A fails prior to B.
This DFT is never fail-safe.
Spare gates. Spare-gates (SPAREs) are the most complex gates in DFTs. Con-
sider the DFT in Fig.2(d) modelling (part of) a motor bike with a spare wheel. If
either wheel fails, the motor bike fails. Both wheels can be replaced by the spare
wheel but not both. The spare wheel is less likely to fail as long as it isn’t used
(warm). Assume the front wheel fails. The spare wheel is available and used, and
its failure rate is increased (hot). If any other wheel fails, then no spare wheels
are available anymore, and the SPARE and the DFT fails.
SF
A B
(a)
SF 0.8
A B
(b)
SF →
A B
(c)
SF
FW BW
W1 W2 WS
(d) (e)
Fig. 2. Simple examples of dynamic nodes.
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SPAREs have a child they use. If this child fails, the SPARE tries to use a
spare child (left to right) — a process we call claiming. Only operational children
that are not used by another SPARE can be claimed. If claiming fails, the SPARE
fails. This behaviour is extended by an activation mechanism. As in [5], SPAREs
may have (independent) subDFTs as children. This includes nested SPAREs. A
spare module is a set of nodes linked to a child of a SPARE via a path without
an intermediate SPARE. Every leaf of a spare module is either a BE or a SPARE.
Each child of a SPARE thus represents a spare module, cf. Fig. 2(e) where boxes
are spare modules and shaded nodes are the representatives. SPAREs which are
not nested are active. For each active SPARE, all nodes in the spare module of
the used child are also active. BEs which are active fail with their active failure
rate, BEs which are passive fail with their passive failure rate (warm events) or
cannot fail (cold events). More details can be found in [13].
2.2 Syntactic restrictions
We are rather liberal w.r.t. dynamic gates, but have to impose syntactic restric-
tions as in [12] to exclude DFTs with undefined behaviour. These restrictions
are: (a) VOTk have at least k children; (b) the top level event is a gate or a BE;
(c) PDEPs and restrictions have no parents; (d) all dependent events are BEs;
(e) spare modules, i.e., subDFTs under a SPARE, do not overlap; (f) primary
spare modules are not shared between SPAREs.
3 State space generation
The goal for our state space generation is to produce a Markov model which is
subject to further analysis. As operational model, we use Markov Automata.
3.1 Markov Automata
Markov Automata (MA) [14] extend continuous-time Markov chains (CTMCs)
with non-determinism. MA are state transition systems whose transitions be-
tween states are either labeled with rates (i.e., non-negative real numbers), or
with actions. The former transitions specify a random delay and correspond to
the failures in DFTs; the latter are used to select the handling of a triggered
PDEP. Delay transitions relate a source state with a target state; action transi-
tions relate a state to a probability distribution over states. An action transition
thus yields a new state with a given likelihood. MA are a slight variant of the op-
erational model for DFTs used in [5]; they differ in allowing discrete probabilistic
branching which are used to model PDEPs. We introduce MAs by example.
Fig. 3 shows an MA for a coffee machine, used by inhabitants of room A
(IoA) and B (IoB). IoA (IoB) arrive at the machine at a rate of 5 IoA/hour
(3 IoB/hour). They can either have coffee or espresso. All IoA want espresso
(action we), while IoB non-deterministically want coffee (action wc) or espresso.
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s0
s1 s2
s3 s4{se} {sc}
5 3
we we wc
1 0.9 0.1 1
ge gc
1 1
Fig. 3. Example MA.
IoB wanting espresso are with probability 0.1 too sleepy
and select coffee. Users always get their selected product
(ge, gc). In state s0, either an IoA or an IoB arrives at
the machine (evolving into s1, s2). In state s1 espresso is
selected, whereas in s2 a choice between actions we and wc
is made. Selecting we in s2 results in s3 with probability
0.1 and in s4 with probability 0.9. The user then gets
the product and the automaton returns to initial s0. For
simplicity, the products’ preparation time is not modelled.
3.2 State space generation
As in Galileo, we construct a fault tree automaton (FTAut) from a DFT. We
then translate the FTAut to an MA, which we further simplify and analyse. The
FTAut consists of states and labelled transitions.
States. We give each node in the DFT a unique id. A state in the FTAut is a
mapping from ids to its status: operational (OP), failed (F), fail-safe (FS), or
don’t care (X). Additionally, we store the currently used child (CUC) of opera-
tional SPAREs and for spare module representatives their activity, i.e. whether
the module is active (A) or passive (P). We initialise all nodes as operational,
the CUCs and activate modules as described in Section 2.
Transitions. State changes originate from the failure of BEs. As the probability
of two rate-governed BEs to fail simultaneously is zero, BEs never fail simulta-
neously. When considering dependencies, this assumption no longer has to hold.
To avoid problems with causalities as described in [13], and to directly resolve
spare races [13], we assume that dependent events fail immediately after the
triggering BE. W.l.o.g. we assume that PDEPs have a single dependent event.
Given a source state and an operational BE x that fails, we copy the source
state and additionally mark x with F, and compute the target state. In a bottom-
up fashion, we iterate over the gates. For each gate, we check the failure con-
dition. If the failure condition holds, we mark the gate as failed. If a CUC of
a SPARE fails, we iterate over its remaining children and check whether they
are not listed as the CUC of any of their parents and whether they are still
operational. If so, we update the CUC, otherwise, we mark the SPARE as failed.
We iterate over all restrictions, and check whether any of their failure conditions
hold; if so, we skip the transition at hand. We then reiterate over all gates, and
check if the fail-safe condition holds (i.e. if it cannot fail in the future), we mark
the gate FS. We then iterate top-down over all nodes. If all parents of a node
are either failed or fail-safe, we mark the node as don’t care (DC-propagation).
Example 1. The FTAut of the DFT in Fig. 2(a) is given in Fig. 4(a). Initially, all
nodes are operational. If B initially fails, the PAND becomes fail-safe, and thus
A and B both become don’t care. The resulting state is (X, X, FS). If A however
initially fails, B and the PAND remain operational. An additional failure of B
then causes the top event to fail. DC-propagation yields the state (X, X, F).
6 Matthias Volk, Sebastian Junges, Joost-Pieter Katoen
(OP, OP, OP)
(F, OP, OP) (X, X, FS)
(X, X, F)
A B
B
(a) FTAut
s0
s1 s2
sF
1 2
2
(b) MA
J
IH
0.8
G
→
BA C D E F
(c) State construction example
PC
A′A
CB B′ C′
(d) Symmetry
Fig. 4. Dedicated examples.
Now consider Fig. 4(c). Initially, every node is operational. A’s failure causes
H to fail and makes B don’t care. This yields a transition from the initial state
to state (F, X, OP, OP, OP, OP, OP, F, OP, OP). In this state, the PDEP is
triggered, yielding a state (with probability 0.8) in which C failed, and the same
state (with probability 0.2) as C does not fail. A failure of D in the initial state
does not trigger a failure of the PAND I; in fact I becomes fail-safe, and this
is propagated to J , i.e., DC-propagation marks all children (and their children)
X. This together yields a transition from the initial state to a state in which all
nodes are marked X, except for G. Finally, from the initial state, propagating a
failure of node F is discarded as the restriction fails (by F failing before E.)
The initial state for nodes (W1,W2,WS ,FW,BW,SF) in Fig. 2(d) is (OP,
OP, OP, W1, W2, OP) where W1, W2 are the CUCs and as initially the CUCs
are active, the activity for W1,W2,WS is given as (A, A, P). A failure of W1 is
propagated to FW. As its CUC fails, it checks further children. WS is operational
and not a CUC, therefore, the resulting state is (F, OP, OP, WS , W2, OP) and
(A, A, A). From that state, W2’s failure yields (F, F, OP, WS , F, F) after
failure propagation, as the only remained child of BW is already claimed. DC-
propagation yields the state (F, X, OP, WS , X, F) and (A, A, A).
As rate-governed transitions have probability 0 to fire at time 0, we either
have immediate transitions or rate transitions. Thus, for each state, we check if
any PDEPs are triggered. If so, we mark the state as immediate and add two
outgoing transitions for each triggered PDEP: One where the PDEP transmits
the failure and one where it doesn’t. Otherwise, we mark the state as Markovian,
and add transitions for each BE which has (in the given state) a failure rate 6= 0.
Translation. The translation from the FTAut to the MA is now straightforward.
The state spaces of the FTAut and the MA are equal. Each MA state is labeled
with the status of the DFT nodes. For Markovian states, each transition labelled
with a BE x is translated into a delay transition with as rate the failure rate
of x. For BEs in passive spare modules, we take their passive failure rate. Each
immediate state has a non-deterministic choice over all triggered PDEPs in the
DFT. For each PDEP, we get a probabilistic branching, where with probability
p the PDEP propagates the failure, whereas with 1−p it does not.
3.3 Optimisations
Technical aspects. We use a selection of well-known techniques to reduce the
overhead of propagation: The states are encoded as bit-vectors, and during ex-
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ploration, we use an expanded state representation. By exploiting depth-first
search, we keep the set of states that we explore later on small. Work lists keep
only track of the nodes we need to consider. Overriding failed and fail-safe nodes
by don’t care, we can merge states which differ only in their past behaviour, but
not in their future behaviour. State spaces are reduced by bisimulation.
Partial-order reduction. In many DFTs, the actual order in which subsets
of BEs fail is not crucial. We exploit this for dependencies, where — instead of
exploring all interleavings over the triggered events — we aim to only explore
a single order. We adapt a technique called (static) partial order reduction [7]
to DFTs. Based on a static analysis, we identify which dependencies can be
executed in arbitrary order, and expand only a canonical order.
State elimination. In MA, we can eliminate probabilistic branching by adopt-
ing a state elimination technique as used in [15]. In particular, this allows us
to reduce MA without non-deterministic branching to CTMCs, which can be
analysed much faster as non-determinism is absent.
Modularisation. Modularisation has been proposed in [16]. It identifies in-
dependent subtrees in the DFT, analyses them separately, and combines the
obtained results to the final result. If applicable, it is extremely powerful.
Symmetry reduction. Many parts in DFTs are symmetric. This can be ex-
ploited (cf. [6]) as follows. Given that we successfully detect the symmetry, we
can use the fact that a fault has an analogous effect in symmetric parts. Moreover
for isolated symmetric parts, if the node identities are not used in the analysis
and the parts are only connected to the remaining DFT via the same node, we
can exchange the states of the parts, and thus assume that a fault in a sym-
metric part happened in an equivalent DFT. In the DFT in Fig. 4(d), we find
two symmetric parts (the subtrees of A and A′), which are independent. If we
are only interested in the top level, we can use the exchange technique. That
is, if both symmetric parts are in equivalent states (e.g., the initial state) and
A′ fails, we can assume that A failed instead. Now, the two parts are not in an
equivalent state. However, after the additional failure of A′, the two parts are in
an equivalent state again.
4 Measures of interest
Once the state space of a DFT is generated (in the form of an MA), several
quantitative measures-of-interest can be determined.
Measures and importance factors. Various measures are based on the re-
liability function, the cdf for the probability of a failure after a given time t.
Another prominent measure is the mean time to failure (MTTF), the expected
time until a system failure. The variance of the time to failure (VTTF) is ob-
tained by Var(X) = E[X2]− E[X]2 for random variable X, the time to failure.
The probability of failure considers the limit probability of the reliability func-
tion for t to ∞. This is of interest as in DFTs not all events fail eventually, cf.
the DFT in Fig. 2(a). These measures can be used for single events in the DFT.
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symbol name cond. par.syn. mod. dc. sym.red.
RF (t) Reliability at t 7 7 3 3 3
PrF Probability of failure 3 3 3 3 3
MTTFF Mean time to failure 3 3 7 3 3
VTTFF Variance of time to failure 3 3 7 3 3
Expected faults before failure 3 3 7 7 3
FV importance factor 3 3 7 7 ∗
Criticality importance factor 3 3 7 3 ∗
Table 1. Supported measures and importance factors
They can also be used for Boolean combinations of failed and operational gates,
such as e.g., the expected time to a DFT state where (only) events A and C
have failed. Another measure-of-interest is the expected number of faults before
the DFT fails; if this is high, it indicates that are various possibilities to take
countermeasures. The Fussell-Vesely importance factor is the probability that a
BE has failed when the DFT fails [17]. An exemplary criticality importance fac-
tor is the probability that a BE causes the DFT to fail. To evaluate the measures
above we use efficient algorithms to verify CTMCs [18] or — if non-determinism
remains — MA [?].
Conditional measures. All measures (except for reliability) can be conditioned
on the occurrence of events, cf. the first column of Table 1. For example, as the
probability of failure does not always equal one, the MTTF is not always defined.
In this case a more reasonable measure is the MTTF conditioned on the fact
that the DFT indeed eventually fails.
Measure preservation under optimisations. Techniques such as modulari-
sation, DC-propagation and symmetry reduction are not applicable to all mea-
sures. Their robustness wrt. the measures is indicated in the last columns of
Table 1, where ∗ means support of a light version. Modularisation is powerful
if a partial state space suffices. This is e.g., the case if the measure is composi-
tional, i.e, the measure can be obtained from its subDFTs’ measures. This holds
e.g., for reliability but not for MTTF. Symmetry reduction requires a lack of
identity (of DFT nodes). Thus only a light variant of symmetry reduction can
be applied to some measures. In the conditional variant, the lack of identity is
also not always given.
5 Parameter Synthesis
Problem. The analysis discussed so far has two drawbacks: It requires all failure
rates in the DFT to be given and does not guarantee any robustness w.r.t.
perturbations. The latter has been addressed by sensitivity analysis [8]. These
deficiencies inspired us to treat symbolic failure rates, i.e. DFTs where failure
rates and propagation probabilities in PDEPs are given as polynomials over a
set of parameters (pDFTs). Our state space construction technique is largely
unaffected by this. Our focus is on the failure rate synthesis in DFTs for any
measure in Table 1 except RF (t), i.e., determine all values (of the symbolic rates)
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(a)
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(b)
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0
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(c)
Fig. 5. (a) Sample output, (b) a sample parametric DFT, and (c) its MTTF.
such that the DFT satisfies a given desired threshold on a measure. For simplicity,
we focus on DFTs that (after our reductions) obey no non-determinism, which
applies to the vast majority of the DFTs in the literature. Thus, the underlying
state space of pDFTs can be reduced to a parametric CTMC, i.e. a CTMC whose
rates are polynomials over the DFT parameters.
Approach. To enable the synthesis in pDFTs we exploit the parameter synthesis
tool PROPhESY [20]. Based on ideas in [15], it computes a closed form (precisely: a
rational function) for a parametric CTMC and the measure of interest. To enable
sensitivity analysis, it provides the derivative w.r.t. the parameters. On top of
obtaining these functions, PROPhESY allows for parameter space partitioning —
using satisfiability-modulo-theory (SMT) techniques for non-linear arithmetic.
That is, given a pDFT, we can synthesise for which parameter values the measure
(e.g., MTTF) is above a threshold. An example output is depicted in Fig. 5(a).
This plot was obtained for the DFT of Fig. 2(d) where W1, W2 and WS have
failure rates x, 1 and y respectively for unknown x, y. The green boxes represent
areas in which all failure rates of W1 and WS give rise to an MTTF that exceeds
1.5, while the red boxes guarantee all rates yield an MTTF below 1.5. For the
white areas, none of the above statements can be made. Note that this output is
extremely valuable as it provides information about many (in fact uncountably
many) failure rate combinations for which the MTTF is below or above the
threshold. We like to point out that obtaining this information is far from trivial,
and intrinsically more involved than analysing a DFT where all failure rates are
given. Consider the small example DFT from Fig. 5(b), where D has a symbolic
failure rate. The MTTF of the DFT is given by the plot in Fig. 5(c). As the
MTTF is not monotonic, the parameter synthesis is not straightforward.
6 Experiments
Set-up. To evaluate the performance of our approach, we tested the perfor-
mance of our tool on reliability and the MTTF assessment. We compare with
the state-of-the-art tool DFTCalc [12] and assess the effect of our abstraction
techniques. The experiments were conducted on an HP BL685C G7, 48 cores,
2.0GHz each, and 192GB of RAM. We restricted the RAM to 8GB and set a
time-out of one hour for all experiments. We use the benchmark suite from [11].
Besides the smaller HCAS and SAP sets, it contains the following benchmarks:
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0
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(c) max. # states in MC
reliability MTTF
DFTCalc SToRMDFT DFTCalc SToRMDFT
# Time # Time # Time # Time
HECS(42) 38 2.8e4 42 3.1e0 36 2.6e4 40 7.0e3
MCS(42) 40 2.1e4 42 2.1e1 38 1.9e4 38 2.1e3
RC(38) 29 2.7e4 38 2.1e0 29 2.7e4 38 6.5e1
SF(30) 26 1.6e4 30 1.8e0 25 1.4e4 29 4.4e3
CAS(8) 8 1.3e3 8 3.6e-1 8 1.3e3 8 3.6e-1
SAP(4) 4 3.6e2 4 3.0e-1 4 3.2e2 4 1.6e-1
(d) #solved & total run time (seconds)
reliability MTTF
none SR DC Mod all none SR DC all
HC2 30.3 15.6 1.1 0.05 0.04 29.9 15.5 1.2 0.61
MC2 337.8 46.0 1.1 0.05 0.05 334.0 45.6 1.1 0.21
RC10 53.6 0.1 53.5 0.20 0.05 53.9 0.1 53.6 0.07
SF62 22.1 7.4 0.3 0.04 0.04 22.3 7.4 0.2 0.08
(e) optimisation run time (seconds)
Fig. 6. Overview of the experimental results on four different benchmark sets.
HECS. The Hypothetical Example Computer System (HECS) stems from the
NASA handbook on FTs [2]. It features a computer system consisting of a pro-
cessor, a memory unit (MU) and an interface consisting of hard- and software.
MCS. The Multiprocessor Computing System (MCS) contains computing mod-
ules consisting of a processor, a MU and two disks, the DFT was given in [9].
RC. The Railway Crossing (RC) is an industrial case modelling failures at
level crossing [21]. It fails whenever any of the sensor-sets, barriers or controller
fails.
SF. The Sensor Filter (SF) benchmark is a DFT that is automatically generated
from an AADL (Architecture Analysis & Design Language) system model [22].
We used the simplified DFTs as produced in [11], as this is shown to be
beneficial for DFTCalc. For each instance, we tested reliability for t = 100 and
the MTTF. Further features were tested on a range of > 100 crafted instances.
Results. Figures 6(a-c) compare the performance of our tool (referred to as
SToRMDFT) with DFTCalc on MTTF (where modularisation is not applicable).
All plots use a log-log-scale. Fig. 6(a) presents the analysis time of a DFT. This
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includes state space generation. The lower dashed line indicates an advantage
of our tool by a factor ten, the upper of a factor 100. The outer lines indicate
TOs and MOs, respectively. Fig. 6(b) indicates the peak memory consumption
as given by the operating system. Fig. 6(c) shows the peak intermediate state
size. Table 6(d) summarises the performance on the benchmark sets — it lists
the number of benchmarks solved and the cumulative time needed for the solved
benchmarks. Table 6(e) shows the effect of the individual optimisation techniques
(symmetry reduction, DC-propagation, modularisation) versus using all of them.
Observations. For non-parametric DFTs the performance is dominated by the
state space construction. SToRMDFT creates intermediate state spaces that are
often ten times smaller; especially for moderately-sized DFTs, this is done with
a much lower overhead. This results in generating state spaces up to 5 orders
of magnitudes faster. The informed state space generation allows to stop ex-
ploring states where the measure of interest is settled. This advantage is best
observed by comparing top events typed OR and AND. The former requires
significantly smaller state spaces, which is reflected by the smaller intermedi-
ate state spaces — and leads to a significant advantage over DFTCalc. These
effects are multiplied by aggressively applying symmetry reductions and DC-
propagation. For many benchmarks, our abstractions directly yield the small
bisimulation quotient. However, on some HECS and MCS instances, our sym-
metry reduction does not yet suffice and DFTCalc gains an advantage in terms
of memory. Modularisation remains a powerful approach for assessing reliabil-
ity. It profits additionally from the performance on small DFTs. Model-checking
for reliability is for both SToRMDFT and DFTCalc so fast that our slightly better
performance is hardly significant. For MTTF, SToRMDFT is significantly faster.
For parametric instances, the original DFTs from literature can be handled:
For, e.g., the standard HECS from literature it takes 5 seconds to compute
the rational function with more than 400 terms in the numerator. Parameter
synthesis for 90% of the parameter space finishes within four minutes. However,
scalability beyond these moderately-sized DFTs remains an open issue, as the
parameters appear throughout the full state space.
7 Conclusions and future work
We have presented a state space generation technique for DFTs that is more
than two orders of magnitude faster than the state-of-the-art. The technique
is complemented with a new feature in DFT analysis — the synthesis of failure
rates for measures such as MTTF. Future work includes the failure rate synthesis
for reliability (e.g., using [23]) and improve scalability for parameterised MTTF.
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